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This study focuses on explaining variations in real constant-quality house prices in
jurisdictions located in multiple MSAs.  Using a hedonic house price framework, we test competing
theories of house price determination.  Using two variants of the random coefficients model, we
find that public school quality has a very large impact on real constant-quality house prices.  Our
results suggest that capitalization of school quality differences occurs on a per lot basis rather than
per square foot of land.  Also important to the explanation of variations in house prices are
variables derived from urban theory, such as distance to the CBD, and from the amenity literature,
such as a community’s crime rate, arts, and recreational opportunities.  
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Many articles have focused on explaining cross-sectional or time-series variations in
metropolitan real constant-quality house prices.  Such explanations are important for testing
theories of house price determination and for predicting future variations.  Our study uses 134
jurisdictions in six metropolitan areas to test competing explanations of why real constant-quality
house prices vary, where we define a constant-quality house as a unit where structural and land
attributes, but not community attributes, are held constant.  Included in the paper are tests of
hypotheses derived from spatial urban theory, local public economics, and the urban amenity
literature.
Our paper differs from most in that we include a wide array of jurisdictions in multiple MSAs
in the sample.  Most studies of constant-quality house prices confine their analysis to consider
price variations in one class of urban areas such as MSAs, central cities, or the suburbs of a single
central city.  By including suburban localities from multiple MSAs in the sample, we open the
analysis to consider intraurban house price variations explained by spatial urban economic
models, jurisdiction-specific amenities, and local public finance theory, as well as interurban
variations in metropolitan-wide variables such as the expected growth rate.  
A particular focus of our study is analysis of the impact of variations in public school
outcomes on real constant-quality house prices.  This focus results from the importance of school
quality to a household's locational choice (Graves and Linneman, 1979) and from the importance
of public schools in models of local public taxes and expenditures.  We find that a measure of
student achievement is very important in explaining spatial variations in real constant-quality house
prices. 5
I.  MODELS OF HOUSE PRICE DETERMINATION
A. Prior Studies
Theoretical models of house price determination can be separated, somewhat arbitrarily,
into those explaining intraurban variations in house prices and those explaining interurban
variations.  The monocentric urban model suggests that land and housing rental rates are
functions of transport costs, household income, metro area population size, and agricultural rental
rates (Mills, 1967; Muth, 1969).  Extensions to land and housing prices, rather than rents, by
Capozza and Helsey (1989, 1990) and Capozza and Schwann (1989) suggest land prices are
determined by transport costs, agricultural rents, income, population, the discount rate, and the
expected growth of income and population.  Intraurban studies of house price differentials caused
by variations in amenities are numerous (Jackson, 1979; Li and Brown, 1980; McMillan, Reid, and
Gillen, 1980; Diamond, 1980; Michaels and Smith, 1990).  Jud (1980), Pollakowski and Wachter
(1990), and Pogodzinski and Sass (1991) added zoning to the list of explanatory factors.  Other
land use or supply restrictions were included by Hamilton (1978), Fischel (1980, 1981), and Rose
(1989), these studies reporting a mixed impact of land use restrictions on housing prices. 
Theoretical models of interurban house price variation include those highlighting the impact
of variations in site-specific factors such as local climate (Haurin, 1980), air pollution and other
amenities (Rosen, 1979; Roback, 1982), or shocks to the urban labor market (Haurin and Haurin,
1988).  Empirical studies with an interurban focus  introduced factors such as crime, recreational
opportunities, and population demographics (Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn, 1988; Beeson and
Eberts, 1989; Peek and Wilcox, 1991; Blomquist and Berger 1992; Potepan 1994).  
A few studies adopted a supply and demand framework to explain house price variation
among metro areas.  Ozanne and Thibodeau (1983) explained 58% of the variation in house
prices among 54 MSAs, but they found only three significant factors:  percent nonelderly singles,6
price of farm land, and number of municipalities in the MSA.  Follow-up studies include Fortura and
Kushner (1986), who used Canadian data, and Manning (1986, 1989), who used 94 U.S. MSAs
and found better correspondence between theoretical predictions and the empirical results. 
Manning explained 84% of the variation in house prices and found the most important explanatory
variables to be construction costs, farm land prices, climate, percentage of high income
households, and a measure of household operating and utility costs.  However, crime, pollution,
total population, density, and population growth had no effect.  Hendershott and Thibodeau (1990)
found variations in real income among 18 cities significantly affected real house prices, but spatial
variations in land supply restrictions and amenities had no impact.  Studies that explain variations
in a single representative value of the house price index among multiple MSAs tend to ignore local
taxes and public goods because of the heterogeneity of taxes and public services within the MSA.
Many empirical studies have linked measures of local public goods and taxes to house
price variations.  Interest increased after Oates’ 1969 2SLS test of the Tiebout hypothesis.  Using
aggregate data, Oates found that increased school expenditures raise property values while
increased taxes lower values, this result replicated by Rosen and Fullerton (1977).  Oates’
interpretation was critiqued by Linneman (1978), Hamilton (1976), Sonstelie and Portney (1980),
and Pollakowski (1982).  Linneman and Hamilton argued that in equilibrium neither effect would be
present, thus neither regression coefficient would be significant.  This point was countered by
Yinger (1982) who argued that supply restrictions allow local taxes and services to be capitalized
into house prices.  Sonstelie and Portney used gross rent rather than market value to test the
Tiebout hypothesis.  Pollakowski objected to Oates’ list of predetermined variables in his 2SLS
approach, noting they may be correlated with the error term in the property value equation.  A
comprehensive critical review of the property tax literature and further empirical study is contained
Yinger, Bloom, Borsch-Supan, and Ladd (1988).  They argue that the property value equation
should be specified in log rather than linear form and note that the effective property tax rate as7
measured in most micro data studies is endogenous because it is computed as the ratio of the tax
on a property to its value.  The tax on a property depends on assessor practices as well as the
stated tax rate; thus, they argue for using the community’s nominal tax rate and variables related to
assessor errors as instruments in a 2SLS econometric model.  In a study of changes in property
values in response to changes in tax rates, Yinger, et al. find evidence for modest capitalization of
property taxes. 
A recent flood of papers on MSA house price determination has been generated by an
interest in understanding observations of substantial intertemporal fluctuations in particular cities or
regions.  This research has been aided by the development of better panel data sets (Thibodeau,
1989,1995; Nothaft, Gao, Wang, 1995; Pollakowski, 1995).  Generally, the fundamental forces
hypothesized to affect MSA-wide house prices are found important in explaining long term
movements in house price.  Poterba (1991) finds that shifts in income and construction costs are
important, but aggregate demographic effects and user cost variations have weak or no effect. 
Significant effects of population demographics are found by Mankiw and Weil (1989) and Case and
Shiller (1990).  In a panel data model, Kim (1993) finds that MSA house prices are explained by
construction costs, interest rates, metro population, income, income growth, and climate. 
However, city-specific intertemporal residuals follow a cyclical pattern that is not explained by
actual or expected changes in market fundamentals.  These short term fluctuations in house prices
may be driven by speculative bubbles forming and bursting (Abrahm and Hendershott, 1993,
1996).  While these studies are informative and provide support for the hypotheses derived from
theoretical economic models of urban areas, they study only a single representative house price in
each MSA; in contrast, our approach combines intraurban and interurban models and focuses on
multiple jurisdictions within MSAs.
B.  Current Study
We include factors influencing both intraurban and interurban variations in house prices. 8
Examples of factors believed to influence the price of housing within an MSA include distance from
the central business district, local amenities, jurisdiction-specific public services and property tax
rates.  Examples of factors that primarily influence entire metropolitan areas and may differ among
MSAs include climate, overall accessibility, arts and recreational opportunities, and the expected
growth of the metro area.  
Our primary community-level public sector explanatory variable is a measure of the
outcome of local public education.  The literature regarding the appropriateness of our proficiency
test score is discussed later in the paper, but similar measures have been used in other hedonic
house price studies.  Other community-level variables included in the explanation of variations in
constant-quality house prices are derived from urban spatial theory (e.g., distance from CBD), local
public economics (e.g., property tax rate), or urban-amenities theory (e.g., crime rate).
The standard urban economic monocentric model argues that within a metro area, the
principal variable causing variations in constant-quality house prices is land price.  Spatial
variations in the rental rate or price per unit of land exist because of differences in transport costs
to the metro area’s central business district.  A typical land rental (p) equation is 
p(r) = P e  where r is distance from the CBD, P is agricultural land rental, R is the distance to
(R-r)
the metro area edge, and   is a conversion parameter that depends on transport cost per mile and
community income.   The land rental equation suggests that distance to the CBD should be
1
included in the house price model.   Agricultural land cost and transport cost per mile are very
2
similar among our MSAs because the areas are in close proximity; thus, we do not include these
variables in our model.   
3
We also test for the impact of MSA-level variables on real constant-quality house prices.
Examples include expected growth of the MSA and a measure of overall MSA accessibility. 
Justifications for these variables are given in aggregative urban models such as Henderson (1985)
- accessibility, and Capozza and Helsey (1989, 1990) - growth.  We include two MSA level amenity9
measures, one measuring the opportunity to attend art events, the other measuring recreational
opportunities.
Our study uses the hedonic house price method to develop a measure of real constant-
quality house prices.  Because our data are cross-sectional, alternative methods such as the
repeat-sales approach are not feasible.  Our variant of the hedonic approach is to relate the natural
log of the real transaction prices for houses (ln V) to a set of structural and land characteristics
(X).   To find the deflated house price, we divide the observed nominal price by  the nonhousing
4
price index for the MSA.   We similarly deflate all other nominal variables in the study.  
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C.  Model
Two forms of hedonic price equation are tested.  In the first, the estimation interacts the
jurisdiction dummy variables with a property’s lot size (L): i
 ln V  = X  + (L  J)   +                                                 (1) ij ij ij j j ij  
where i is a transacted house, j is the school district, and   is a random error.    represents j
jurisdiction-specific shifts in the implicit price of a square foot of land, thus testing one form of the
capitalization hypothesis.  The second form includes a series of dummy variables (J) indicating the j
jurisdiction (school district) of an observation:
ln V  = X  + J ’ +                                                          (2) ij ij j j ij
The coefficients  ’ represent the percentage deviations of an average house price in district j from j
that of a constant-quality house.  Only the regression intercept changes among districts, thus
testing another form of the capitalization hypothesis.
In the second step of the analysis, the coefficients   and   ’ are related to a vector of j j
community and MSA level variables Z: j
   = Z  + µ                                                              (3) j j j
  ’ = Z ’ + µ’.                                                          (3') j j j
Eqns. (3) and (3') are the capitalization tests for the community and MSA variables.  The functional10
form of eqns. (2) and (3') tests for an impact through changes in the implicit price of land, thus the
impact differs among houses within a jurisdiction depending on a property’s lot size.    In
contrast, the form of (1) and (3) tests for an equal percentage impact of variations in lot size on all
houses in a district. 
II.  DATA AND METHODS 
A.  Data
The  primary source of data for this study is a file of 1991 housing transactions in the six
largest metro areas in Ohio (Amerestate, 1991).  We limit the sample to single-family detached
houses and eliminate outliers.   Eliminating any school district having less than 17 observed house
6
sales trims the sample to 140 school districts.  This process yields a sample of 45,236 transactions
with over a third being from the central cities of our six MSAs.  Variable means and standard
deviations are reported in Table I for both the complete sample and a sample that excludes the
central city transactions.  Detailed definitions of all variables are listed in the data appendix. 
Explanatory variables in (3) are drawn from various sources including the Places Rated Almanac
(Savageau and Boyer 1993), the Ohio Department of Education, the School District Data Book
(MESA Group 1994), and the Office of Criminal Justice Services of the State of Ohio. 
[INSERT TABLE I]
B.  Method
The pair of eqns. (1) and (3) or the pair (2) and (3') are forms of random coefficient models;
estimation methods are discussed by Amemiya (1978).  We follow the method of Garman and
Richards (1990) where equations (3) and (3') are substituted into (1) and (2) respectively.  The
resulting single equation models are:  
 ln V  = X  + (L  Z )  + µ +  .                                                (4) ij ij ij j  j ij11
and
ln V  = X  + Z ’ + µ’ +                                                        (4') ij ij j j ij
The form in (4) is the same as in Garman and Richards where a multistep GLS procedure
is used to correct for the heteroskedastic error.  Assuming the errors in (1) and (3) are
uncorrelated, the variance of the error in (4) is (  L  +  ) where   is the variance of µ and   is
2 2 2 2 2
ij j
the variance of  .  These variances are estimated in auxiliary regressions of (1) and (3) where   in ij j
(3) is the vector of estimated coefficients of the interaction variables in (1).  The final step is to
estimate (4) correcting for the estimated heteroskedasticity, yielding consistent and asymptotically
efficient estimates. 
Eqn. (4') is a random effects model, this frequently used in the analysis of panel data and
requiring use of generalized least squares.  It is appropriate in our case because we test for
jurisdiction-specific mean zero random errors in house prices (µ).    j
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C.  Explanatory Variables 
Measures of the house and lot characteristics include age, square footage of house and
garage, full and part baths, unenclosed and enclosed porches, deck, patio, pool, air conditioning,
fireplace, number of outbuildings, and quarter of sale within the survey year.
The highlighted local public service is a measure of public school outcomes, specifically,
the percentage of ninth grade students passing all four parts of a proficiency test administered in
all public schools in the state. This variable has a mean of 43.2 and ranges from 6 to 89.  The test
is administered each year of high school; thus, aggregate passage rates rise as a cohort of
students moves through high school.  State law requires that a student pass each of the four
components of the test to receive a high school diploma.   The literature on measuring the
8
outcomes of K to 12 education raises the question as to the best measure of school quality:  test
scores, attendance rate, college continuation rate, dropout rate, or wages later in life.  We argue
that our measure is easily observed (results are published in newspapers), varies greatly among12
districts, and is directly relevant for parents’ judging the probability of a student receiving a high
school diploma; thus, it is an appropriate measure.
Prior studies have included measures of school quality or outcomes when explaining house
price variations.  Li and Brown (1980) find that 4th graders’ test scores have a positive and
significant impact on house prices in Boston.  Jud and Watts (1981) used test scores in a hedonic
house price study of a single jurisdiction and estimated the demand for school quality in a second
stage estimation.  Dubin and Sung (1990) use a J test to contrast alternative combinations of
variables to use in their semilog hedonic house price equation and decide to exclude their two
measures of school quality because measures of race and socio-economic status dominate. 
Pogodzinski and Sass (1991) find that scores on a statewide achievement test positively and
significantly affect house prices. 
The other public sector variable in our model is the property tax rate in the community.  Our
data set does not contain the tax on each property or the assessed value of the property; thus, we
cannot construct the effective tax rate for each property.  Rather, we must use the nominal rate
reported for each jurisdiction.  This measure is exogenous and Yinger, et al. (1988) proposed its
use as an instrumental variable for the effective tax rate.  The omitted component of the property
tax rate is the property-specific assessor’s error (Goodman, 1983).  
Other explanatory variables in the house value equation include three suggested by the
urban model: distance of a property to the CBD, an aggregate measure of accessibility in each
MSA, and expected MSA population growth.  We expect increased accessibility or expected
growth, and decreased distance to the CBD to be positively related to constant-quality house
prices.  We measure expected growth by the ratio of 1990 to 1980 MSA population, the
accessibility measure is from Places Rated Almanac (1993), and distance to CBD is approximated
by the distance of a jurisdiction’s centroid to the MSA’s CBD. 
The amenity literature suggests that an increased crime rate in a jurisdiction reduces the13
price per unit of housing.  Our measure is the number of serious crimes per capita; the definition
includes murders, rapes, robbery, aggravated assault, motor vehicle theft, and arson.  We also
include average income and MSA recreational and arts opportunities as measures of amenities
present in a jurisdiction.   The final variables included in the estimation are the percentage of
9
nonwhite households, this potentially capturing variations in house prices resulting from
discrimination, and the percentage of households residing in the jurisdiction for fewer than six
years, this being a measure of community stability. 
 III.  RESULTS
Preliminary regressions of eqns. (1) and (2) reveals substantial variation in house prices
among jurisdictions.  From (1) we find that constant-quality house prices range from 35% lower to
70% higher than the reference district, Columbus OH.  Evaluated at the mean lot size, we find from
(2) constant-quality variation in the price of land of 30% lower to 85% higher than the reference
district.  Both results suggest a much greater spread of constant-quality house prices at the
community level than at the MSA level.  In the six MSAs in our study, the average MSA price
variation compared with the Columbus MSA ranged from 6.4% lower to 7.7% higher. Results
10
of estimating eqns. (4) and (4') are contained in Table II.  We report the results based on the
sample of jurisdictions excluding the six central cities, leaving 134 localities and 29,718
observations.  Estimated coefficients are somewhat sensitive to whether central city properties are
included, suggesting possible specification problems when extending the model to cover both
central cities and suburbs.
11
A.  GLS Model with Lot Size Interaction Variables: Eqn (4)
The house and lot characteristics generally have the expected signs and are significant. 
One exception is the number of outbuildings, this not significant.  The interpretation of increased lot14
size is complicated by the inclusion of the interaction terms, but the overall marginal impact is
positive.  We find that increased square footage of the house or garage increase house price, but
at a decreasing rate.  Increasing age reduces house value and the negative coefficient for AGE
SQUARED implies housing depreciates at an increasing rate. 
In our estimation of (4) we include both the community variable-lot size interactions and the
level of the community variables (e.g., both TEST SCORE and LOT*TEST SCORE).  If only the
coefficient of the interaction variable is significant, then the impact of the community level variables
is solely through changes in a property’s implicit price per square foot of land.  Thus, large lots are
impacted at a higher rate.  However, if the impact of high quality schools is to create a fixed
premium per property independent of lot size, then the coefficient of TEST SCORE will also be
significant.  For example, a positive TEST SCORE coefficient combined with a negative coefficient
for the LOT-SCORE interaction implies that the capitalization of high quality schools into property
values is a greater percentage for small properties than large, this result consistent with a relatively
fixed school quality premium per property.
Table II’s results show that all community variables’ coefficients have the expected sign. 
Moreover, all are significant except the MSA growth rate and the tax rate (both have t-values of
1.2).  Generally, the lot size-community variable interactions have the opposite sign of the
community variables, the exceptions being the aggregate accessibility variable (not significant) and
average income and recreational opportunities (both significant).  Thus, although the community
variables clearly affect the value of property in a  jurisdiction, the change is not simply a constant
percentage increase or decrease in the price per unit of land. 
The impact of our focal variable, school quality, on property value is shown through the
following example.  Compare a house with sample mean value of $76,115 in a community with a
test score of 43 to an identical house and community except test score is one point higher.  The
result is that house value rises by $380.  If the community’s proficiency test pass rate is two15
standard deviations above the sample mean (this value is still below the sample maximum), house
value rises to $89,930, an 18 percent increase.
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Another evaluation of the impact of variations in school quality is to compare two houses,
one with a larger lot than the other, but otherwise identical, in each of two communities.  In the
community with a higher TEST SCORE the value of both houses is higher, but the changes
depend on the strength of the negative coefficient of the LOT*TEST SCORE variable compared
with the impact of the nonlinear estimation.   The resolution of the offsetting effects is that within a
13
standard deviation of the mean lot size, the impact of a higher test score on house value is nearly
independent of lot size.   We find that superior school quality is capitalized into property values,
14
but the capitalization is about the same for all properties in a school district.
B.  Random Effects Model: Eqn. (4')
Generally, the results in the random effects model are similar to those in the interaction
variable model.  Some differences are noted for the age of a house and the number of out
buildings.  Overall explanatory power is the same.  The coefficient of TEST SCORE implies that
every additional percent of students passing the test raises house value by $400, equaling one-half




Our study focuses on explaining variations in constant-quality house prices among 134
communities in multiple MSAs.  Explaining differences in house prices requires hypotheses to be
drawn from both intraurban and interurban economic models.  We find that real constant-quality
house prices are explained by factors from both perspectives and they combine to explain 70% of
the observed price variation.
School quality is the most important cause of the variation in constant-quality house prices. 16
We find that each percentage point increase in the pass rate of ninth grade students on a
statewide proficiency exam increases house prices by one-half percent.  Because pass rates vary
among sampled communities from 6 to 89 percent, constant-quality house prices vary greatly due
to this factor alone.  The estimation results suggest that the capitalized premium for high quality
schools is relatively constant per lot rather than being constant per square foot of land.  
Other factors important to the explanation of constant-quality house prices include distance
from the CBD, metro area accessibility, crime rate, percentage of nonwhite households, average
household income, and indexes of metro area arts and recreational opportunities.  We found no
consistent impact of expected population growth, the nominal property tax rate, or community
stability.  
Prior studies of a single house price representative of an entire MSA have been limited in
two ways.  First, they exclude hypotheses about house price variations derived from spatial models
of urban areas and from local public economics.  Second, they do not attempt to explain the
substantial house price variation among communities within a single MSA.  Developing a model
that explains why house prices vary among communities within an MSA and among MSAs is the
greatest challenge, requiring hypotheses from both intraurban and interurban perspectives. 17
1. The negative exponential form is derived under the restriction that the price elasticity of demand
for housing is -1.0.
2.  Some studies use population density instead of distance to the CBD.  We select distance
because it is a more fundamental variable and density may be endogenous.  If substituted for
distance, density works equally well in our estimation.   
3.  Construction costs are also relatively constant in the jurisdictions in the sample. 
4.  This semi-log form has been used in many studies with justifications listed in Thibodeau (1989). 
We used a Davidson-MacKinnon test (1981) to determine whether a semi-log or a linear form of
hedonic equation is preferable; however, the test result is inconclusive.  King (1977) objects to
inclusion of the property tax rate in a linear hedonic, but Sontelie and Portney (1980) note that this
objection is ameliorated if a semi-log form is used.  We opt for the semi-log form based on the
literature and because the estimated coefficients better conform to theoretical expectations.
5.  The deflators are from the American Chamber of Commerce cost of living index (ACCRA 1991,
1992). 
6.  We deleted observations with lot sizes greater than two acres and those with transaction prices
over $400,000 or below $10,000.  Outliers in lot size, square feet of housing, and garage size were
also eliminated.  Mean real house value is $76,115.
7.  We use Limdep 7.0 (1995, Ch. 17.3) which uses a two step procedure.
8.  Students completing high school, but failing to pass the exam receive a certificate of
attendance.
9.  Climate is not included because the relatively close proximity of the six MSAs in the sample
yields little variation.  Measures of zoning or land supply restrictions are not available.
10.  The six MSAs in the sample are Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, and Toledo.
Footnotes18
The smallest PMSA is Toledo with 1990 population of 0.61 million and the largest is Cleveland with
population 2.20 million.  
11.  We tested for systematic differences in house characteristic implicit prices between central city
properties and suburban properties by running separate hedonic regressions, then pooling the
data.  A Chow test of the equality of the two sets of coefficients strongly rejects equality.  Further,
coefficient equality is rejected even if a dummy variable for central city location is included in the
pooled regression.
12.   A quadratic test score was tried in the estimation, but it proved to be insignificant with a
coefficient near zero.
13.  That is, if the only impact of a higher test score was the linear term in the hedonic, house value
would rise more for the house with the larger lot because of the logarithmic form.
14.  The point estimates suggest that the amount capitalized decreases slightly as lot size rises,
but not by a economically significant amount.
15.  The results in the full sample are generally similar.  Differences include the MSA growth rate
becoming significant and positive, as expected, and the tax rate unexpectedly becoming positive
and significant.  The impact of TEST SCORE on house value is about the same, $400 per point.19
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TABLE I
Descriptive Statistics 
Values for the full sample of 45,236 are reported first, followed by values for the sample of  29, 718 transactions in
suburban jurisdictions.
                 Full Sample                                Suburban Sample        
   Variables   Mean        Standard Dev.                  Mean              Standard Dev.
Age (10s)   4.21 2.48   3.44 2.25
Air Conditioning   0.36 0.48   0.44 0.49
Autumn Sale   0.28 0.45   0.28 0.45
Crime Rate   0.02 0.01   0.01 0.01
Deck    0.11 0.31   0.14 0.35
Distance to CBD   8.95 6.59 12.27 5.75
Enclosed Porches    0.15 0.38   0.14 0.36
Fireplace   0.39 0.49   0.47 0.50
Full Bath    1.31 0.50   1.40 0.54
Garage Size (1000s)   0.33 0.19   0.36 0.19
House Size (1000s)   1.46  0.51   1.55 0.54
Log House Price 11.04 0.61 11.24 0.51
Lot Size (10000s)   1.06 0.89   1.26 1.00
MSA Accessibility Index 47.88 6.03 48.72 5.74
MSA Arts Index 11.56 4.50 12.13 5.56
MSA Population Growth   1.73 4.93   1.39 4.70
MSA Recreation Index  20.91 4.59 21.03 4.80
Out Buildings    0.03 0.18   0.04 0.20
Part Bath    0.35 0.49   0.44 0.52
Patio   0.21 0.41   0.25 0.43
Nonwhite Households   0.18 0.17   0.08 0.11
Pool   0.01 0.11   0.02 0.13
Property Tax Rate 35.12 6.16 35.02 6.36
Real Income 32.64 14.67 39.33 13.77
Test Score 33.71 17.98 43.17 14.85
Turnover Rate    0.48 0.08   0.47 0.09
Summer Sale   0.31 0.46   0.31 0.46
Unenclosed Porches   0.76 0.73   0.67 0.70
Winter Sale   0.24 0.43   0.23 0.42
       28
TABLE II 
Estimation of Real House Prices  
a
                Interacted Model                                       Inte rcept Model          
Variables Coefficient    Standard Error    Coefficient     Standard Error  
b b
Constant 986.82**    5.7 948.77**   11.15 
Age -3.96** 0.28 -6.00**  0.29
Age-squared -0.07** 0.03  0.06** 0.02
Lot Size  -2.60    4.29 10.12**  0.50
Lot Size Squared -0.10** 0.01 -0.93**  0.07
House Size 43.22**  1.72 42.99**  1.66
House Size-squared -2.88** 0.45 -2.95**  0.43
Garage Size  33.13**  2.36 34.86**  2.23
Garage Size-squared -23.99**   3.52 -23.53**    3.24
Deck  5.52** 0.51 5.22** 0.50
Unenclosed Porches 1.62** 0.29 1.27** 0.28
Enclosed Porches  1.29** 0.52 1.62** 0.51
Fireplace 8.14** 0.41 8.12** 0.41
Air Conditioning 6.81** 0.41 6.69** 0.40
Full Bath  6.31** 0.46 6.88** 0.45
Part Bath  5.67** 0.40 5.73** 0.39
Out Buildings  0.78   0.88 1.93*  0.81
Pool 3.32** 1.30 4.30** 1.19
Patio 2.36** 0.49 2.48** 0.46
Summer Sale 5.09** 0.49 5.18** 0.47
Autumn Sale 5.58** 0.50 5.75** 0.48
Winter Sale 5.22** 0.51 5.28** 0.50
Distance to CBD -1.32** 0.07 -1.27**  0.15
Lot*Distance to CBD 1.14   0.60 ----  
Test Score 0.68** 0.04 0.52** 0.09
Lot*Test Score -0.10** 0.03 ----  
Property Tax Rate -0.08    0.06 0.23    0.12
Lot*Property Tax Rate 0.14** 0.05 ----  
Real Income 0.21** 0.04 0.31** 0.08
Lot*Real Income 0.05*  0.02 ----  
Crime Rate -292.73**     39.80   -272.38**      98.24 
Lot*Crime Rate 73.95*    33.30   ----  
Turnover Rate  -9.45** 4.46 17.22     9.08
Lot*Turnover Rate 8.46** 3.38 ----  Variables Coefficient    Standard Error    Coefficient     Standard Error  
b b
29
Nonwhite Households -49.19**   3.95 -32.69**    7.32
Lot*Nonwhite Household 22.92**  3.73 ----  
MSA Population Growth Rate 0.12   0.10 0.30   0.19
Lot*MSA Population Growth Rate -0.03    0.08 ----  
MSA Accessibility Index 0.46** 0.08 0.78** 0.16
Lot*MSA Accessibility Index 0.05   0.06 ----  
MSA Arts Index 1.18** 0.10 0.81** 0.23
Lot*MSA Arts Index -0.35** 0.08 ----  
MSA Recreation Index  0.24** 0.09 0.60** 0.19
Lot*MSA Recreation Index 0.20** 0.07 ----  
Adjusted R 0.70   0.70  
2
Dependent Variable is 1990 Log Real Transaction House Price.  Sample size is 29, 718 transactions in suburban jurisdictions.   *Significant at 5%
a
level, **Significant at 1% level.
  All coefficients and standard errors are x10 .  
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DATA APPENDIX
VARIABLE NAME DESCRIPTION and SOURCE (in parentheses)
House Characteristics
AGE Age of house in tens of years (2)
AIR CONDITIONING  Air conditioning dummy (2)
DECK Deck dummy (2)
ENCLOSED PORCHES Number of enclosed porches (2)
FIREPLACE Fireplace dummy (2)
FULL BATH Number of full bathrooms (2)
GARAGE SIZE  Garage size in thousands of square feet(2) 
HOUSE SIZE House size in thousands of square feet (2)
LOG REAL TRANSACTION  Log of transaction amount for house, deflated by MSA nonhousing price index (2)
HOUSE PRICE
LOT SIZE Lot size in tens of  thousands of square feet (2)
OUT BUILDINGS Number of out buildings on property (2)
PART BATH Number of partial bathrooms (2)31
PATIO Patio dummy (2)
POOL Pool dummy (2)
UNENCLOSED PORCHES Number of unenclosed porches (2)
Community /MSA Characteristics
CRIME RATE Serious crimes including murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, motor
vehicle theft, and arson, per 1,000 residents (5)
DISTANCE TO CBD  A measured in mile of the distance from the centroid of a jurisdiction to the MSA’s
center 
MSA ACCESSIBILITY INDEX A measure of the MSA ease of accessibility.  The variable is a weighted average of 
lower than average commuting time to work, mass transit availability, highway 
accessibility, air and train accessibility, in thousands (1)
MSA ARTS INDEX A measure of the number of arts performances, museums, and library holdings in the 
MSA (1)
MSA POPULATION GROWTH 1990 population of the MSA divided by 1980 population (1)
RATE
MSA RECREATION INDEX A measure of recreational opportunities in the MSA including theaters, sports, parks,
golf courses, zoo/aquarium, restaurants (1)
NONWHITE HOUSEHOLDS The percentage of nonwhite households/100 (4)
PROPERTY TAX RATE Nominal property tax millage rate (3) 32
REAL INCOME  Deflated average income, in thousands (4)
TEST SCORE  Percentage of ninth grade students who passed all sections of the 1990 state 
proficiency test.  The test included sections on reading, writing, math, and 
citizenship (3)
TURNOVER RATE Percentage of households who have lived in the district less than 6 years (4)
Sources:
(1) Places Rated Almanac.
(2) Amerestate housing tape.
(3) Ohio Department of Education, Division of Education Management Information Services.
(4) School District Data Book (MESA Group 1994).
(5) Office of Criminal Justice Services of State of Ohio.